Professor Laksiri Fernando, University of Colombo
To be little more precise, a diaspora community can be analyzed in three main forms: (1) as a category of population (2) as a category of consciousness and (3) as a category of political activism. Let me take one by one with particular reference to the Sri Lankan Tamil community.
Population
Diaspora community in general is a large entity. It is estimated that around 200 million people or nearly 3 percent of the world’s population lives outside their places of origin. Significant diaspora communities in the world today are the Jews, the Palestinians, the Chinese, the Irish, the Armenians, the Kurds, the Sheikhs and the Tamils. The Tamils perhaps constitute, after the Chinese, the most widely scattered community. They are scattered from Philadelphia to Fiji and from Sweden to South Africa. The total number estimated to be around three million. But all the diaspora Tamils are not Sri Lankans. According to Sriskandarajah,
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora consists of some 700,000 people settled in North America, Europe, India, and Australasia. Most members of the diaspora have migrated since the mid 1980s, primarily as a direct and indirect result of an ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka.[2]
The above figure is corroborated by R. Cheran and Oivind Fuglerut.[3] There is a possibility that some sections are not estimated in this figure particularly those who are in Latin America. But in most of the other studies, figures are overestimated to include some of the Tamil sections from South India. A recent figure, given by the International Crisis Group (ICG), is one million without quoting any source.[4]
There must have been around 40,000 Tamils who had left the country for socio-economic or professional reasons before 1983. Those were predominantly migrants. But the others are mainly those who have left the country after the July 1983 communal riots against the Tamils, and their offspring. UNHCR reported that between 1980 and 1999 that there were over 25,000 asylum seekers in Europe. During more or less the same period, Sri Lanka was among the top three source countries for refugee claims in Canada.
Consciousness
There must have been around 40,000 Tamils who had left the country for socio-economic or professional reasons before 1983. Those were predominantly migrants. But the others are mainly those who have left the country after the July 1983 communal riots against the Tamils, and their offspring. UNHCR reported that between 1980 and 1999 that there were over 25,000 asylum seekers in Europe. During more or less the same period, Sri Lanka was among the top three source countries for refugee claims in Canada.
Consciousness
Talking about consciousness of any community is a hazy affair. There is no possibility of speaking about a single or a constant consciousness. However as a national minority, and as the largest national minority for that matter, it could be assumed that the Tamil consciousness in general must have been higher than any of the other communities in Sri Lanka. This is reciprocal given the fact that Sinhala nationalism has also been quite vociferous, both before and after independence.
Those who left the country before 1983 must have had a general Tamil national consciousness common to that period. This must have waned as they adapted to the host country and possibly got again strengthened when their community in Sri Lanka got into trouble after 1983. It is a fact that all communities, including the Muslims, tended to perceive themselves and their identity on ethnic lines since the beginning of the 20th century. What could be observed was the prevalence of ‘ethno nationalism’ instead of ‘civic nationalism’ among the masses of all communities and their political leaders.
Those who left the country after 1983, seeking asylum and refugee status, definitely were with a higher ethnic consciousness. They were concerned about the situation of their fellow community in Sri Lanka for ethnic and more closely for family links. This is what could be termed as ‘long distance nationalism’ as people like Benedict Anderson talked about. It is possible that many of the members, at least for a long period of time, retained a collective memory of pain, dispossession and trauma. This is the type of consciousness that the LTTE utilized for its political objectives. However, it is difficult to believe that this consciousness or sentiments remained unchanged. There were those who left the country because of LTTE violence. There were others who wanted to adapt themselves to the conditions of the host country. In 2001, during a Canadian census, only 96,645 Tamils out of around 215,000 identified themselves as Tamils. This was against strong campaigning by the LTTE related Tamil organizations to do so. This was only 45 percent of the Tamil population.
During the period between 1983 and 2001 the Tamil diaspora consciousness could be considered high. The indicators were their activism. There were over 50 websites reframing the mind-set of the Tamil diaspora. Aftermath of the ceasefire agreement, however, there were signs that the strong sentiments were changing although many diaspora members were keen in assisting the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in the North and the East. Some of the websites slowly became moderate. Another reason which affected the change was the international atmosphere after 9/11. This was a major turning point. The LTTE now became a banned organization in many Western countries. Again there was much silent disillusionment when the LTTE went against the peace process in 2003.
The complete defeat of the LTTE perhaps was not what many of the diaspora members wanted even if they were not sympathetic to the organization. Therefore, there was an immediate upsurge of sentiments aftermath of the defeat in May 2009. This is clear when you look at the CNN, BBC or Washington Post interviews during that period. It was on that premise apparently that the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) was first mooted in July 2009. However when elections were held during April May this year, for its Transnational Assembly, the response was poor. As DBS Jeyaraj noted,
Those who left the country before 1983 must have had a general Tamil national consciousness common to that period. This must have waned as they adapted to the host country and possibly got again strengthened when their community in Sri Lanka got into trouble after 1983. It is a fact that all communities, including the Muslims, tended to perceive themselves and their identity on ethnic lines since the beginning of the 20th century. What could be observed was the prevalence of ‘ethno nationalism’ instead of ‘civic nationalism’ among the masses of all communities and their political leaders.
Those who left the country after 1983, seeking asylum and refugee status, definitely were with a higher ethnic consciousness. They were concerned about the situation of their fellow community in Sri Lanka for ethnic and more closely for family links. This is what could be termed as ‘long distance nationalism’ as people like Benedict Anderson talked about. It is possible that many of the members, at least for a long period of time, retained a collective memory of pain, dispossession and trauma. This is the type of consciousness that the LTTE utilized for its political objectives. However, it is difficult to believe that this consciousness or sentiments remained unchanged. There were those who left the country because of LTTE violence. There were others who wanted to adapt themselves to the conditions of the host country. In 2001, during a Canadian census, only 96,645 Tamils out of around 215,000 identified themselves as Tamils. This was against strong campaigning by the LTTE related Tamil organizations to do so. This was only 45 percent of the Tamil population.
During the period between 1983 and 2001 the Tamil diaspora consciousness could be considered high. The indicators were their activism. There were over 50 websites reframing the mind-set of the Tamil diaspora. Aftermath of the ceasefire agreement, however, there were signs that the strong sentiments were changing although many diaspora members were keen in assisting the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in the North and the East. Some of the websites slowly became moderate. Another reason which affected the change was the international atmosphere after 9/11. This was a major turning point. The LTTE now became a banned organization in many Western countries. Again there was much silent disillusionment when the LTTE went against the peace process in 2003.
The complete defeat of the LTTE perhaps was not what many of the diaspora members wanted even if they were not sympathetic to the organization. Therefore, there was an immediate upsurge of sentiments aftermath of the defeat in May 2009. This is clear when you look at the CNN, BBC or Washington Post interviews during that period. It was on that premise apparently that the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) was first mooted in July 2009. However when elections were held during April May this year, for its Transnational Assembly, the response was poor. As DBS Jeyaraj noted,
Though campaigning was intense the actual voter turn-out was not impressive at all. Despite many instances of vote rigging the number of votes polled was comparatively low. In most countries the number of votes amounted to about 10%-15% of the total Tamil population.[5]
Political Activism
There cannot be much dispute that political activism of the Tamil diaspora was controlled by the LTTE until recently. No other party was allowed to function in many countries. The links between diaspora and home country insurgencies are not an uncommon phenomenon in many troubled regions. However, there had been no previous or later phenomenon where the insurgency was so closely linked to the creation of diaspora.
The Tamil diaspora undoubtedly was not a total creation of the LTTE. The July 1983 riots against the Tamils and the ensuing war between the government forces and the LTTE were the main reasons. However, the process of seeking asylumabroad, except perhaps initially in India, has had a particular pattern and most of the efforts were coordinated by the LTTE. Or in other words, the LTTE networks in diaspora emerged out of this process. The LTTE created easy avenues for the Tamils to migrate and professional human traffickers were employed for the task.
The LTTE within years became one of the best organized transnational terroristnetworks in the world. It had its most important political wing led by Anton Balasingham and fund management and procurement wing led by Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias KP. It had its country operatives, fundraisers, hit squads, propaganda networks and political lobby. In any major city in the West, it could mobilize two to three hundred people for instant agitation at any given time. There was a network of Western NGOs supporting the organization. Overseas human as well as financial resources for the LTTE came from the Tamil diaspora apart from through its dubious ‘business ventures.’ The funds were then diverted to Sri Lanka for terrorist activities. It was estimated that international fundraising approached nearly $ 80 million per year during its peak. The LTTE related Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) collected approximately $ 10,000 per month in early 2000s.
Canada and the United Kingdom were two major countries where the LTTE had immense influence on local politics and in turn could put pressure on Sri Lanka as well as on international organizations. Toronto constituency of Canada had over 6,000 eligible Tamil voters and the Minister of Foreign Affairs one time came from this constituency. The LTTE infiltrated the Liberal Party. At one point, Tamil party delegates outnumbered others in many constituencies.
An important question is that what factors led to this diaspora activism which sustained LTTE terrorism for such a long period of time? Apart from what can be called the ‘long distance nationalism,’ it appears that certain dislocations related to the host country also were responsible for diaspora activism. The difficulties in accessing desirable employment, feeling of alienation in a different cultural setting and perhaps the felt discrimination in the new society were some of the reasons for continued activism. While most of these reasons appear to be disappearing or people getting adjusted to the new situation, still there is a cohort of diaspora, perhaps around 10 percent, that could and does support the LTTE politics perhaps in a different form. One form is the Transnational Government for Tamil Eelam (TGTE).
Current Situation
There was a strong reaction on the part of the Tamil diaspora when the LTTE was defeated in May 2009. The following was a glimpse of what was reported on BBC website.
There cannot be much dispute that political activism of the Tamil diaspora was controlled by the LTTE until recently. No other party was allowed to function in many countries. The links between diaspora and home country insurgencies are not an uncommon phenomenon in many troubled regions. However, there had been no previous or later phenomenon where the insurgency was so closely linked to the creation of diaspora.
The Tamil diaspora undoubtedly was not a total creation of the LTTE. The July 1983 riots against the Tamils and the ensuing war between the government forces and the LTTE were the main reasons. However, the process of seeking asylumabroad, except perhaps initially in India, has had a particular pattern and most of the efforts were coordinated by the LTTE. Or in other words, the LTTE networks in diaspora emerged out of this process. The LTTE created easy avenues for the Tamils to migrate and professional human traffickers were employed for the task.
The LTTE within years became one of the best organized transnational terroristnetworks in the world. It had its most important political wing led by Anton Balasingham and fund management and procurement wing led by Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias KP. It had its country operatives, fundraisers, hit squads, propaganda networks and political lobby. In any major city in the West, it could mobilize two to three hundred people for instant agitation at any given time. There was a network of Western NGOs supporting the organization. Overseas human as well as financial resources for the LTTE came from the Tamil diaspora apart from through its dubious ‘business ventures.’ The funds were then diverted to Sri Lanka for terrorist activities. It was estimated that international fundraising approached nearly $ 80 million per year during its peak. The LTTE related Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) collected approximately $ 10,000 per month in early 2000s.
Canada and the United Kingdom were two major countries where the LTTE had immense influence on local politics and in turn could put pressure on Sri Lanka as well as on international organizations. Toronto constituency of Canada had over 6,000 eligible Tamil voters and the Minister of Foreign Affairs one time came from this constituency. The LTTE infiltrated the Liberal Party. At one point, Tamil party delegates outnumbered others in many constituencies.
An important question is that what factors led to this diaspora activism which sustained LTTE terrorism for such a long period of time? Apart from what can be called the ‘long distance nationalism,’ it appears that certain dislocations related to the host country also were responsible for diaspora activism. The difficulties in accessing desirable employment, feeling of alienation in a different cultural setting and perhaps the felt discrimination in the new society were some of the reasons for continued activism. While most of these reasons appear to be disappearing or people getting adjusted to the new situation, still there is a cohort of diaspora, perhaps around 10 percent, that could and does support the LTTE politics perhaps in a different form. One form is the Transnational Government for Tamil Eelam (TGTE).
Current Situation
There was a strong reaction on the part of the Tamil diaspora when the LTTE was defeated in May 2009. The following was a glimpse of what was reported on BBC website.
We are very angry and every single Tamil is crying over this. Victory? The Sri Lankan government has merely made a territorial gain at the moment. There are LTTE supporters all over the place and all over the world. Unless we have a solution for the Tamil people, this problem will continue. We don't believe in the death of Prabhakaran unless some proof is put forward. We have to wait and see. All the Tamils have faith in him. [6]
The above perhaps was an initial ‘general feeling’ of the Tamil diaspora irrespective of whether they directly supported the LTTE or not. Today everyone knows that Prabhakaran is dead and the government’s victory is not merely a ‘territorial gain.’ The point is that, whatever the myths, illusions and ideals that govern any nationalism, in the long run, the people have to come to grips with realities if they want to make an impact in politics and the fate of their destinies.
In other words, I would argue that there is, and always there has been, a considerable gap between the reality and the perceptions of the ‘Tamil diaspora’ with one strong qualification. The qualification is that the Tamil diaspora is not a monolith. There is diversity and differentiation, and the LTTE perhaps is or was not the only determining factor of the Tamil diaspora. The majority perhaps has always been a silent majority. Only a vociferous minority was supporting the LTTE objectives. The former LTTE support base is also split today into the TGTE and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF).
The gap that I am talking about is not only about the methods or terrorism that many Tamil leaders or diaspora leaders appear to agree today, except a few, but mainly about the objectives or the Thimpu principles or the Vaddukkoddai resolution. In my view, there is a very clear linkage or symbiosis between the two, the aims and the methods. They operate within a vicious cycle where one cannot be separated from the other.
The concepts of ‘unique nation,’ ‘homeland’ or sectarian ‘self-determination’ are outdated today. The Tamils can have self-determination through elections in Sri Lanka, unlike in the LTTE period. This is the true and democratic self-determination. Any ethnic community, including the Sinhalese, has to think in broader terms to achieve their social or cultural objectives in harmonious manner within a framework of civic nationalism and not ethno-nationalism. The West should not encourage ethno-nationalism. Any support for the TGTE is against peace in this country and internationally.
The well meaning Tamil diaspora sections should consider now whether they continue to pursue the LTTE objective of Eelam or whether their concern is about the welfare and betterment of their brethren in Sri Lanka both economically and politically. There are much prospects, I believe, in the economic sphere and political solutions are obviously trickier than the others. However political issues could be addressed with fresh minds, with patients and cooperation.
Let me quote finally what Michael Ignatieff of Canada told The Globe and Mail on 25 October 2001 on (Tamil) diaspora nationalism.
In other words, I would argue that there is, and always there has been, a considerable gap between the reality and the perceptions of the ‘Tamil diaspora’ with one strong qualification. The qualification is that the Tamil diaspora is not a monolith. There is diversity and differentiation, and the LTTE perhaps is or was not the only determining factor of the Tamil diaspora. The majority perhaps has always been a silent majority. Only a vociferous minority was supporting the LTTE objectives. The former LTTE support base is also split today into the TGTE and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF).
The gap that I am talking about is not only about the methods or terrorism that many Tamil leaders or diaspora leaders appear to agree today, except a few, but mainly about the objectives or the Thimpu principles or the Vaddukkoddai resolution. In my view, there is a very clear linkage or symbiosis between the two, the aims and the methods. They operate within a vicious cycle where one cannot be separated from the other.
The concepts of ‘unique nation,’ ‘homeland’ or sectarian ‘self-determination’ are outdated today. The Tamils can have self-determination through elections in Sri Lanka, unlike in the LTTE period. This is the true and democratic self-determination. Any ethnic community, including the Sinhalese, has to think in broader terms to achieve their social or cultural objectives in harmonious manner within a framework of civic nationalism and not ethno-nationalism. The West should not encourage ethno-nationalism. Any support for the TGTE is against peace in this country and internationally.
The well meaning Tamil diaspora sections should consider now whether they continue to pursue the LTTE objective of Eelam or whether their concern is about the welfare and betterment of their brethren in Sri Lanka both economically and politically. There are much prospects, I believe, in the economic sphere and political solutions are obviously trickier than the others. However political issues could be addressed with fresh minds, with patients and cooperation.
Let me quote finally what Michael Ignatieff of Canada told The Globe and Mail on 25 October 2001 on (Tamil) diaspora nationalism.
Diasporic nationalism is a dangerous phenomenon because it is easier to hate from a distance: You don’t have to live the consequences…So it is appropriate to say to newcomers: You do not have to embrace all our supposed civilities. You can and should keep the memory of the injustice you have felt firmly in your heart. But the law is law. You will have to leave your murderous fantasies of revenge behind.
Let me say final few words about the TGTE. There is no legal or moral basis for this transitional government. The UN Charter or international law does not allow that kind of governments. It is an obvious threat to Sri Lanka’s security. To say the least, this formation and its proclaimed objectives complicate the post-conflict reconciliation.
The above article is based on a recent lecture on the subject by Professor Laksiri Fernando.
The above article is based on a recent lecture on the subject by Professor Laksiri Fernando.
[1] Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 7 (2), 1999.
[2] Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Tamil Diaspora Politics,” Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Springer, 2005. p. 492.
[3] R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Policy Paper, Berghof Foundation, Berlin, 2004. p. 9. Ovind Fuglerut, Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism, Pluto Press, London, 1999.
[4] “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” Asia Report No. 186, February 2010. This was the same number Christopher McDowell gave in 1996.
[5] “The Politics of Transnational Tamil Eelam Govt.” Daily Mirror, 29 May 2010, p. 9.
[6] Vasuki Muruhathas, Lawyer, London, 19 May 2009.
[2] Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Tamil Diaspora Politics,” Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Springer, 2005. p. 492.
[3] R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Policy Paper, Berghof Foundation, Berlin, 2004. p. 9. Ovind Fuglerut, Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism, Pluto Press, London, 1999.
[4] “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” Asia Report No. 186, February 2010. This was the same number Christopher McDowell gave in 1996.
[5] “The Politics of Transnational Tamil Eelam Govt.” Daily Mirror, 29 May 2010, p. 9.
[6] Vasuki Muruhathas, Lawyer, London, 19 May 2009.
- Asian Tribune -
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